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This experiment examines how members’ individualistic or cooperative motivational 
orientations affect the processes and outcomes of negotiating groups. A total of 228 students 
participated in a three-person negotiation simulation where motivational orientations were 
induced through written instructions and members were aware of each other’s orientations. 
Results showed that groups with only cooperative members were more satisfi ed with their 
negotiations than were groups with other member compositions. Conversely, groups with 
only individualistic members achieved higher joint gains than did groups with other member 
compositions. Process analyses indicated that individualistic groups increased their integrative 
activities and decreased their distributive activities toward the end of their negotiations. Our 
results challenge the dominant view that individualistic orientations are detrimental for group 
processes and outcomes.
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challenges associated with complexity in infor-
mation, interpersonal relations, procedures, 
and strategies all increase when there are three 
or more negotiators, rather than just two (see 
Kramer, 1991).
Groups often have to negotiate decisions because 
their members have confl icting interests and 
opinions. According to the negotiation liter-
ature (see De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000), 
agreements that best reconcile everyone’s 
interests and generate better outcomes are 
reached when negotiators share a cooperative 
motivational orientation (they want to maxi-
mize both their own and others’ outcomes). How-
ever, most of the research in this area involves 
dyadic negotiations, and although negotiations 
in dyads and groups share many character-
istics, they also differ in important ways (Bazerman, 
Mannix, & Thompson, 1988). For example, 
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Unfortunately, research on motivational orien-
tations in negotiating groups is limited, and the 
few studies that have been done largely ignore 
the fact that members of the same group can 
have different motivational orientations. Mixed 
orientations are especially likely in groups that 
are diverse in other ways as well (Brett, 2001). 
Furthermore, group members may or may not be 
aware of one another’s motivational orientations. 
For example, members of management teams 
or cross-functional teams inside organizations, 
and members of business teams operating 
between organizations (e.g. joint ventures), may 
know much about one another from previous 
encounters. Rumours, gossip, and reputations 
may also allow people to make reasonable as-
sumptions about one another’s motivational 
orientations. Yet the effects of knowledge about 
the motivational orientations of others in nego-
tiating groups have seldom been studied. 
The available research evidence thus reveals 
little about negotiation processes and out-
comes in groups whose members differ in their 
motivational orientations and are aware of those 
differences. We thus designed an experiment 
to investigate such groups. We focused on 
individualistic and cooperative motivational 
orientations because they seem to be the most 
common (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993) and have 
been found to have substantial impact on dyadic 
negotiations (De Dreu, Weingart et al., 2000). We 
examined motivational orientations stemming 
from situational characteristics (states) rather 
than individual dispositions (traits), because 
situational characteristics are easier to infl uence 
from a managerial point of view and are related 
more strongly to organizational settings (e.g. 
climate factors, incentive systems). Finally, we 
included both objective and subjective outcome 
measures because research has shown that 
negotiators consider more than just material 
gains and losses (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 
2006), and because there is often a disconnect 
between the quality of negotiated agreements 
and the satisfaction parties derive from them 
(Galinsky, Mussweiler, & Medvec, 2002).
The effects of motivational orientations on 
negotiation processes and outcomes can be 
understood using Dual Concern Theory (Pruitt & 
Rubin, 1986). This theory suggests that a nego-
tiator’s behavior is determined by two motives, 
namely the person’s concerns for (a) his or her 
own outcome and (b) the outcomes of others. 
When a negotiator has high concern for the 
outcomes of both the self and others (similar to 
a ‘cooperative’ orientation), he or she behaves 
in an integrative way, displaying problem-solving 
behavior by exchanging information in a trust-
worthy manner. But when a negotiator has 
high self-concern and low concern for others 
(similar to an ‘individualistic’ orientation), he 
or she behaves in a distributive way, displaying 
contentious behavior by using pressure tactics 
and persuasive argumentation to gain conces-
sions. Consistent with Dual Concern Theory, 
a meta-analytic review by De Dreu, Weingart 
et al. (2000) found that pairs of negotiators with 
cooperative orientations, relative to pairs with 
individualistic orientations, indeed engaged in 
more integrative behavior and less distributive 
behavior. These behaviors, in turn, led to higher 
joint outcomes in cooperative rather than 
individualistic dyads. 
The integrative behavior of cooperators 
and the distributive behavior of individualists 
may be even greater when negotiators are aware 
of each other’s motivational orientations. For 
example, when cooperators negotiate with each 
other, knowing that they share a cooperative 
orientation may make it easier to reveal their 
true preferences and opinions and to trust the 
information that others give them. Greater 
information exchange, combined with higher 
levels of trust, may stimulate integrative pro-
cesses and thereby produce higher joint gain 
and satisfaction. Conversely, when individualists 
negotiate with each other, knowing that they 
share an individualistic orientation may promote 
‘power games’—negotiators demand concessions 
from each other, without making concessions 
themselves. Such tactics may stimulate distributive 
processes that lead to dissatisfaction and lower 
joint gains.
All in all, research on dyadic negotiation sug-
gests that joint gains will be better (Hypothesis 1), 
satisfaction will be greater (Hypothesis 2), and 
the negotiation process will be more integra-
tive and less distributive (Hypothesis 3) when 
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there are more cooperative members in a nego-
tiating group.
But research on dyads could be misleading 
when it comes to negotiating groups. For 
example, group negotiations impose extra 
challenges on participants (see Bazerman et al., 
1988; Kramer, 1991). In dyadic negotiations, a 
person can focus on the behavior of the other 
party and concentrate his or her energy on 
infl uencing that person. In groups, however, 
it is also necessary to consider other parties, 
who may have different strategies and may not 
all respond to one’s behavior in the same way 
(Brett, 1991). In groups, there is also a potential 
for coalition formation, which cannot occur in 
dyads (Mannix, 1994; Ten Velden, Beersma, & 
De Dreu, 2007). These differences suggest that 
our earlier hypotheses might be too simplistic. 
For example, having just one individualistic group 
member might be enough to keep everyone else 
on their toes (cf. Kelley & Stahelski, 1970), or 
that person might be isolated by a coalition of 
cooperative members (cf. Brett, 1991).
Recent research on the role of motivational 
orientations in group negotiations has indeed 
produced complex results. Although cooperative 
rather than individualistic group members do 
show more integrative processes, less distribu-
tive processes, and better satisfaction and joint 
gains (Beersma & De Dreu, 2002, 2005; Weingart, 
Bennett, & Brett, 1993), a close examination of 
this work shows that such fi ndings only occur 
under specifi c circumstances. For example, 
Weingart et al. (1993) found that cooperative 
groups do better than individualistic groups 
only when people are instructed to consider 
issues sequentially. When people consider issues 
simultaneously (as they do in many real life 
situations), individualistic groups do as well as 
cooperative groups. Under these circumstances, 
individualistic negotiators may be unwilling to 
make unilateral concessions because they don’t 
trust others to make comparable concessions in 
response. Thus, they compromise rather than 
integrate. Similarly, Beersma and De Dreu (2002) 
found that cooperative groups outperform 
individualistic groups only when the structure of 
the negotiation is asymmetrical (two parties have 
compatible preferences that are incompatible 
with the preferences of other parties). When 
the structure is symmetrical (as it is in many real 
life situations), the outcomes of cooperative 
groups are not signifi cantly better than those of 
individualistic groups. When the structure of a 
negotiation is asymmetrical, individualists may 
get locked into coalitions and not dynamically 
trade issues.
Moreover, some studies have found no out-
come differences at all across different group 
compositions (Schei & Rognes, 2005; Weingart, 
Brett, & Olekalns, 2002). In their research on 
three-person negotiating groups, for example, 
Schei and Rognes (2005) found comparable 
outcomes in cooperative, individualistic, and 
mixed groups. Similarly, Weingart et al. (2002) 
found no outcome differences among four-
person groups composed of all cooperative, all 
individualistic, or mixed members. Weingart and 
her colleagues also examined the negotiation 
processes in their groups and found more inte-
grative behavior in groups that contained more 
cooperative members. Finally, a few researchers 
have even found that negotiating groups with 
more individualistic members achieve better 
outcomes. For instance, Shapiro and Rognes 
(1996) measured the confl ict orientations of 
group members and found that a ‘dominating’ 
style (similar to an individualistic motivational 
orientation) improved group outcomes. 
So, what other predictions could be made 
about the effects of motivational orientations 
on the outcomes of negotiating groups? The 
fi ndings just cited suggest that a more careful 
analysis is needed. Groups that contain only 
cooperative members may focus heavily on co-
operation and thus satisfice (Simon, 1957), 
choosing the fi rst acceptable solution that is 
proposed, rather than searching for an optimal 
solution, which can be hard to fi nd (Kramer, 
1991). An emphasis on cooperation may also 
lead group members to abandon their individual 
interests, believing that this will help the group. 
To develop high quality agreements, however, it 
may be necessary for negotiators to remember 
their personal interests and not yield uncritically 
(Pruitt, 1983). Indeed, yielding behavior can be 
detrimental for cooperators. A meta-analytical 
review by De Dreu, Weingart et al. (2000) showed 
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that cooperative negotiators only reached mutu-
ally benefi cial outcomes when they had high 
resistance to yielding. When resistance to yielding 
was low, cooperative negotiators engaged in less 
problem-solving, were more contentious, and 
achieved lower joint outcomes. If cooperative 
group members have information about one 
another’s orientations, then tendencies toward 
satisfi cing may be even higher than when such 
information is absent. 
If cooperative negotiating groups can per-
form poorly because of their tendency to com-
promise and satisfi ce, then individualistic groups 
may perform well because of enlightened self-
interest (Rubin, 1991). Individualistic members of 
groups often use arguments to persuade others 
to make concessions. Knowing that other group 
members are also individualistic, however, may 
lead a negotiator to doubt his or her ability to 
exploit others. If other negotiators are indeed 
unlikely to make concessions, then the only way 
to get a high personal outcome is to enlarge the 
pie through integrative behavior. An escalating 
integrative process (Olekalns, Brett, & Weingart, 
2003), coupled with an energetic search for good 
personal outcomes, may drive individualistic 
groups toward optimal solutions. Indeed, work 
by Harinck and De Dreu (2004) showed that 
people who experience temporary impasses in 
the fi rst part of their negotiations often realize 
that a change in behavior is needed to accom-
plish their goals. 
Integrative processes and good outcomes 
may be diffi cult to achieve when members are 
aware of differences in their motivational orien-
tation. Individualistic members may try to take 
advantage of people they know are cooperatively 
oriented and cooperative members may try to 
protect themselves against such exploitation. 
These groups may thus experience low joint 
outcomes and dissatisfaction because they lack 
the integrative process usually associated with 
optimal agreements. Indeed, Schei and Rognes 
(2003) found that in mixed dyads (cooper-
ators versus individualists), where the individual-
ists knew that their opponents were cooperatively 
motivated, integrative activities, perceived 
negotiation quality, and joint outcomes were 
all low.
Thus, as a set of alternatives to our earlier 
hypotheses, we propose that joint gains will 
be maximized when all group members are 
individualists (Hypothesis 4), satisfaction will 
be maximized when all group members are 
cooperators (Hypothesis 5), and the negotiation 
process will be more integrative and less 
distributive toward the end of a negotiation 
when all group members are individualists 
(Hypothesis 6).
Method
Sample
We studied 228 undergraduate business students 
(35% female, mean age = 21 years) enrolled in an 
organizational behavior course. The participants 
were randomly assigned to have a cooperative 
or an individualistic orientation. And they were 
each assigned to negotiate in a three-person 
group that was either (1) cooperative (n = 20), 
with three cooperators (CCC); (2) cooperative 
majority (n = 19), with two cooperators and one 
individualist (CCI); (3) individualistic majority 
(n = 19), with one cooperator and two indi-
vidualists (CII); or (4) individualistic (n = 18), 
with three individualists (III). 
Negotiation task
We used a negotiation task identical to the one 
used by Schei and Rognes (2005). Three people 
negotiated the construction of a joint offi ce com-
plex for a business partnership involving an air-
line company, an insurance company, and a con-
sulting company. The payoff matrices are shown 
in Table 1. Five issues had to be negotiated: (1) 
move-in date, (2) geographical location of the 
building, (3) architectural design, (4) distribu-
tion of maintenance costs, and (5) establishment 
of joint service functions. The group had to 
resolve all fi ve issues to reach an agreement. The 
negotiation simulation was symmetric, giving all 
the members both the same maximum number of 
achievable points and equal chances of earning 
those points. The task had both integrative and 
distributive issues. The three integrative issues 
(Issues 2, 3, and 5) allowed for joint gain through 
logrolling (cf. Mannix, Thompson, & Bazerman, 
1989). The two distributive issues (Issues 1 and 4) 
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made the symmetry in the payoff matrix less 
obvious and thus raised the level of potential 
confl ict in the groups. 
Manipulation of motivational orientations
We followed previous research on motivational 
orientations in negotiation and manipulated the 
two orientations through written instructions. 
The manipulations were presented as instruc-
tions to negotiators from the management 
of their companies (cf. Weingart et al., 1993). 
In the individualistic condition, participants 
read that their primary goal was to maximize own 
outcome. In the cooperative condition, participants 
read that their primary goal was to maximize own 
and group outcome. We examined the effects of 
these instructions by asking the participants to 
indicate in the post-negotiation questionnaire 
which primary objective they had during the 
negotiation: (a) maximize own outcome, (b) 
maximize own and group outcome, or (c) other 
(cf. Weingart et al., 1993). The instructions 
had a signifi cant impact on the participant’s 
responses (χ2 (2, N = 228) = 152.77, p < .001). 
In the cooperative condition, 92% of the 
subjects answered ‘maximize own and group 
outcome’, and in the individualistic condition, 
86% of the subjects answered ‘maximize own 
outcome’. Consistent with earlier studies of 
mixed motivational orientations (e.g. Schei & 
Rognes, 2003, 2005), we included in our primary 
analyses only those groups where all members 
answered the manipulation check question 
correctly (n = 16, 17, 15, 12 groups in the CCC, 
Table 1. Payoff matrices
Airline Insurance Consulting
Issues Alternatives company company company Sum
Issue 1 A 25 0 50 75
B 25 25 25 75
C 0 50 25 75
D 50 25 0 75
Issue 2 A 150 12.5 25 187.5
B 200 0 0 200
C 100 25 50 175
D 0 50 100 150
E 50 37.5 75 162.5
Issue 3 A 50 100 0 150
B 0 0 200 200
C 37.5 75 50 162.5
D 12.5 25 150 187.5
E 25 50 100 175
Issue 4 A 0 100 50 150
B 50 0 100 150
C 50 50 50 150
D 100 50 0 150
Issue 5 A 100 0 50 150
B 75 50 37.5 162.5
C 50 100 25 175
D 25 150 12.5 187.5
E 0 200 0 200
Minimum payoff 0 0 0 675
Maximum payoff 500 500 500 825
Note: Negotiators saw only their own payoffs, and were not allowed to exchange preference charts.
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CCI, CII, and III conditions, respectively, for a 
total of 180 individuals). Exploratory analyses 
that included data from all of the groups pro-
duced results similar to those from the primary 
analyses.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted during a class 
meeting in the course. Each negotiator received 
confi dential role instructions, manipulation 
instructions, a profi t schedule that showed the 
individual earnings associated with different 
possible alternatives, and information about 
the motivational orientations—cooperative 
or individualistic—that could be expected 
from their opponents. The participants had 
15 minutes to read their role information 
and prepare for the negotiations. The groups 
were allowed to negotiate for 45 minutes. Finally, 
participants answered the post-negotiation 
questionnaire, which contained background 
information and the manipulation check and 
the process measures. Afterwards, participants 
were debriefed, thanked for their help, and 
dismissed.
Measures
Joint outcomes We measured joint outcomes 
by examining (a) joint sums and (b) Pareto 
effi ciency. We chose to include both measures 
because they are conceptually different and prior 
research on group negotiation has shown that 
they can produce different results (De Dreu, 
Giebels, & Van de Vliert, 1998; Weingart et al., 
1993). Joint sum was measured as the sum of the 
profi ts achieved by the three negotiators in a 
group. For example, if a group’s members agreed 
on alternative A for all fi ve of the issues, then 
the joint sum for that group would be 712.5. 
The range of joint sums was 675 (minimum) to 
825 (maximum) points. Pareto effi ciency related 
actual agreements to Pareto optimal settle-
ments. A Pareto optimal agreement implies 
that the group has reached an agreement that 
cannot be improved unless one of the group 
members accepts a lower individual outcome. 
We developed an index, based on work by Tripp 
and Sondak (1992), who measured the number 
of possible agreements that were Pareto superior 
to the solution chosen by each group. Hence, 
we looked at each group’s actual agreement and 
counted the number of possible agreements 
that would have produced a better individual 
outcome for at least one of the group members, 
without lowering the individual outcomes for 
any other members. This measure was positively 
skewed (1.78), so we did a log transformation 
to normalize its distribution (skewness after 
transformation = 0.12). We then standardized 
the variable and reversed it so that higher values 
indicated greater Pareto effi ciency. 
Satisfaction We measured satisfaction as the 
average of three items in the post-negotiation 
questionnaire: ‘How satisfi ed are you with the 
negotiation outcome?’, ‘How satisfi ed are you 
with the negotiation process?’, and ‘To which 
degree is the group agreement acceptable to 
you?’. Responses were made on a 5-point Likert-
scale ranging from 1 (very dissatisfi ed) to 5 
(very satisfi ed). The reliability coeffi cient of the 
overall satisfaction scale was α = .74. To measure 
satisfaction at the group level, we calculated 
the inter-rater agreement index for multiple 
items ( James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984, 1993). 
Average inter-rater agreement was .83, and did 
not differ signifi cantly across the group compos-
ition conditions. This is well above the suggested 
benchmark of .70 (George & Bettenhausen, 
1990), and justifi es the use of satisfaction as a 
group variable (George & James, 1993). Finally, 
after inspecting for outliers on the satisfaction 
scale, the score on one item in one group was 
removed because it had a standardized value 
above |3|. 
Negotiation processes We measured the 
negotiation process using several other items 
on the post-negotiation questionnaire. The 
relevant items are shown in Table 2. Responses 
were made on a 5-point Likert-scale rang-
ing from 1 (to a low extent) to 5 (to a high 
extent). The participants were asked to evaluate 
both integrative activities (e.g. information 
exchange, trust) and distributive activities (e.g. 
pressure tactics, argumentation). A principal 
component analysis with oblique rotation 
revealed the two expected factors (integrative 
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and distributive), both with eigenvalues larger 
than one and explaining 30.2 and 24.1% of the 
variance, respectively. All of the items in Table 2 
loaded above (or close to) .50 on just one of 
the factors. 
Consistent with the procedure used by Schei 
and Rognes (2003), group members discussed 
together each of the items in Table 2 before 
giving their individual responses. Group mem-
bers typically gave the same response, making the 
inter-rater agreement index ≈ 1. Also consistent 
with Schei and Rognes (2003), the participants 
fi rst answered questions regarding the overall 
negotiation process, and then the process in 
each of three phases. Participants were told 
that Phase 1 should be seen as about the fi rst 
25% of the time used, Phase 2 as about the next 
50% and Phase 3 as about the last 25%. These 
roughly correspond to the initiation, problem-
solving, and resolution phases uncovered in 
past work on negotiation (see Holmes, 1992). 
Inspecting for outliers showed that in three 
cases integrative items had standardized scores 
above |3|, so the score on these items for the 
respective groups were therefore removed. 
The reliability coeffi cients were α = .66 for the 
integrative activities scale and α = .61 for the dis-
tributive activities scale. We found these coef-
fi cients acceptable, given the broad and somewhat 
formative nature of the measures. 
Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics and correlations 
for the measures. Group composition, as meas-
ured by number of individualistic members 
(0 to 3), was positively correlated with joint sums 
and Pareto effi ciency, and negatively correlated 
with satisfaction. Integrative and distributive 
activities showed relatively low correlations 
with group composition and group outcome 
variables. The two outcome measures, joint sums 
and Pareto effi ciency were so highly correlated 
with one another that they were essentially the 
same variable. Therefore, in the subsequent 
Table 2. Factor analysis for measures of the negotiation process
Process items Integrative Distributive
1. Not sure that the truth was told (reverse-coded) .79 –.09
2. Trusted the information exchange .77 –.04
3. Communicated our interests clearly  .68 .33
4. Exchanged information about interests/priorities .52 –.02
5. Pressed to get individual interests through .09 .82
6. Confl ict among members –.35 .82
7. Argumentation .11 .49
Note : The numbers shown are factor loadings.
Table 3. Means, standard deviations, and correlations
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5
1. Group composition (no. of 
individualists)
2.42 1.09 1
2. Joint sums 758 42 .38** 1
3. Pareto effi ciency 0.00 1.00 .38** .94*** 1
4. Satisfaction 3.49 0.33 –.37** .06 .04 1
5. Integrative activities (overall) 4.11 0.57 –.09 .18 .04 .14 1
6. Distributive activities (overall) 3.50 0.61 .10 –.06 .03 –.09 .08
** p < .01; ***p < .001.
Note : n = 60 groups.
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analyses, we report the results for joint sums, 
which is the most widely used outcome meas-
ure. Using Pareto effi ciency as a measure of 
joint outcome yielded similar results. Finally, we 
checked for gender effects, but found none.
Group outcomes
We fi rst examined the effects of group compos-
ition on group outcomes. Table 4 shows means, 
standard deviations, and the results from an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), along with pair-
wise comparisons. Group composition had a 
signifi cant effect on joint sums (F(3, 56) = 7.51, 
p < .001, η2 = .29). Individualistic groups achieved 
higher joint sums (M = 802) than did cooperative 
groups (M = 750), cooperative majority groups 
(M = 740), or individualistic majority groups 
(M = 749). Pairwise comparisons showed that 
joint sums were signifi cantly higher in the indi-
vidualistic groups than in groups with any of 
the other three compositions (p < .01), with no 
signifi cant differences among the groups with 
those other compositions. These results do not 
support Hypothesis 1, but they do support the 
alternative, Hypothesis 4. 
Group also had a signifi cant effect on satis-
faction (F(3, 56) = 4.98, p < .01, η 2 = .21). 
Members of cooperative groups were more 
satisfi ed (M = 3.74) than members of individual-
istic groups (M = 3.36), individualistic majority 
groups (M = 3.44), or cooperative majority 
groups (M = 3.36). Pairwise comparisons showed 
that satisfaction was significantly higher in 
cooperative groups than in groups with each 
of the other compositions (p < .01). No other 
comparisons were signifi cant. Thus, the results 
do not support Hypothesis 2, but they do support 
the alternative, Hypothesis 5. 
Negotiation processes
We first examined how group composition 
infl uenced integrative activities, such as those 
involving information exchange and trust. Group 
composition did not affect these activities over-
all (F(3, 56) = 0.32, ns). The means across 
group composition conditions are shown in 
Table 5. To analyze integrative activities further, 
we did a 4 (Compositions) × 3 (Phases) ANOVA 
with Phases as repeated measures. Phase had 
a signifi cant linear impact on integrative acti-
vities (F(1, 56) = 10.33, p < .01, η2 = .16). As 
Table 5 shows, integrative activities increased 
over time. The interaction between Composition 
and Phase was also signifi cant (F(3, 56) = 6.68, 
p < .001, η2 = .26). The means show that this 
interaction effect occurred because the indi-
vidualistic groups (III)—unlike the other group 
compositions—had a very strong increase in 
integrative activities during their negotiations. 
They had the least integrative activity in Phase 1 
and the most integrative activity in Phase 3. 
Analyzing the integrative negotiation process 
(from Phase 1 to Phase 2 to Phase 3) in each of 
the four compositions showed that individualistic 
groups were the only ones whose integrative 
activities increased signifi cantly throughout 
the three phases (F(1, 11) = 16.24, p < .01, 
η2 = .60). In these groups there were more 
Table 4. ANOVA results for group outcomes across group compositions
Group composition
Group outcomes CCC CCI CII   III F (3, 56) Eta-square
Joint sums    
 Mean 750a 740a 749a 802b 7.51*** .29
 SD 44 44 23 33
Satisfaction
 Mean 3.74a 3.36b 3.44b 3.36b 4.98** .21
 SD 0.29 0.37 0.25 0.33
** p < .01; ***p < .001.
Notes : Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < .01. CCC = cooperative groups, 
CCI = cooperative majority groups, CII = individualistic majority groups, and III = individualistic groups.
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integrative activities in Phase 2 than in Phase 1 
(p < .01), and more in Phase 3 than in Phase 2 
(p = .05). Indeed, individualistic groups ended 
up having more integrative activities in Phase 3 
than did both kinds of mixed orientation 
groups (p < .05), but not signifi cantly more than 
cooperative groups. 
Next, we examined how group composition 
affected distributive activities, such as those in-
volving pressure tactics and argumentation. 
Group composition did not affect these activities 
overall (F(3, 56) = 0.76, ns). The means across 
compositions are shown in Table 5. To analyse 
distributive activities further, we did another 
4 (Compositions) × 3 (Phases) ANOVA with 
phases as repeated measures. Phase did not 
have a linear effect on distributive activities 
(F(l, 56) = 0.14, ns), but it did have a strong 
quadratic effect (F(l, 56) = 21.35, p < .001, 
η2 = .28). The means in Table 5 show a reversed 
U-shaped pattern—distributive activities in-
creased from Phase 1 to Phase 2 and then decreased 
in Phase 3. The interaction between Composition 
and Phase was also signifi cant (F(3, 56) = 4.65, 
p < .01, η2 = .15). The interaction effect occurred 
because the individualistic groups (III)—unlike 
the other groups—reduced their distributive 
activities from the first to the final phase. 
Although their distributive activities were highest 
(among all the composition conditions) at fi rst, 
individualistic groups fi nished with the lowest 
distributive activities. Analyzing the distributive 
negotiation process (from Phase 1 to Phase 2 to 
Phase 3) in each of the four compositions showed 
that the individualistic groups (and to a lesser 
degree, the individualistic majority groups) were 
the only compositions with a signifi cant decrease 
in distributive activities from Phase 2 to Phase 
3 (p < .05). Importantly, individualistic groups 
ended up having less distributive activities in 
Phase 3 than did both kinds of mixed groups 
(p < .05), but not signifi cantly less than the 
cooperative groups.
Taken altogether, the results for integrative 
and distributive activities do not support 
Hypothesis 3, but they do support the alternative, 
Hypothesis 6. 
Additional analyses
In addition to testing the various hypotheses, we 
also examined the relationship between nego-
tiation processes and joint sums using regression 
analyses. The results are shown in Table 6. We 
ran four separate regressions, examining both 
Table 5. Means and standard deviations for integrative and distributive activities across group compositions 
and negotiation phases
Integrative activities Distributive activities
Group composition Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Overall Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Overall
Cooperative (CCC)
 Mean 3.99 4.19 4.26 4.23 3.27 3.46 3.33 3.38
 SD 0.61 0.53 0.58 0.56 0.80 0.86 0.72 0.73
Cooperative majority (CCI)
 Mean 4.10 4.03 4.08 4.05 3.10 3.70 3.56 3.47
 SD 0.66 0.64 0.57 0.65 0.72 0.48 0.58 0.44
Individualistic majority (CII)
 Mean 3.99 4.02 3.98 4.04 3.22 3.93 3.53 3.69
 SD 0.68 0.59 0.66 0.64 0.67 0.82 0.79 0.61
Individualistic (III)
 Mean 3.55 4.20 4.52 4.10 3.58 3.75 2.92 3.45
 SD 0.83 0.47 0.40 0.53 0.77 0.43 1.07 0.49
Total
 Mean 3.91 4.11 4.19 4.07 3.29 3.71 3.34 3.45
 SD 0.70 0.56 0.58 0.61 0.74 0.65 0.79 0.73
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the overall negotiation process and each of the 
three negotiation phases. The overall negotiation 
processes had no signifi cant effect on joint sums 
(R 2 = .04, ns), nor did the negotiation processes 
in the two fi rst phases (Phase 1: R 2 = .02, ns, Phase 2: 
R 2 = .03, ns). However, negotiation processes 
in Phase 3 did have a signifi cant impact on 
joint sums (R 2 = .27, p < .001). Integrative 
activities in that phase had a signifi cant positive 
effect on joint sums (β = .36, p < .01), whereas 
distributive activities had a signifi cant negative 
effect (β = –.35, p < .01). We also inspected the 
effects of negotiation processes on joint sums 
for each of the four group compositions separ-
ately. The results mainly paralleled the overall 
pattern, except that the negotiation processes 
in Phase 3 had very little impact on joint sums 
in the individualistic majority groups, and the 
positive effects of integrative activities on joint 
sums in Phase 3 were especially strong in the 
individualistic groups (β = .71, p < .01). 
Finally, we examined mediation effects. 
Mediation analyses may help us understand the 
mechanism through which motivational orien-
tation affects joint sums. Thus, we believed that 
the high joint sums achieved by the individual-
istic groups could be explained by these groups 
being high on integrative activities and low on 
distributive activities. As noted earlier, group 
composition (the independent variable) had 
signifi cant effects on both the dependent variable 
( joint sums) and on the mediator (negotiation 
processes), and negotiation processes (in 
Phase 3) signifi cantly affected joint sums. The 
remaining question is how group composition 
and the negotiation processes in Phase 3 mutually 
affected joint sums. We did hierarchical analyses 
to test for mediation, following the recommen-
dations outlined by Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger 
(1998). Joint sums were regressed on group com-
position and negotiation processes—entering 
Composition in Step 1 and entering Phase 3 
activities, (integrative and distributive) in Step 2. 
The results are shown in Table 7. Entering the 
process variables (integrative and distributive) 
into the model increased R 2 signifi cantly from 
.15 to .37 (F(2, 56) = 9.62, p < .001). Integrative 
activities had a positive effect on joint sums 
(β = .34, p < .01), and distributive activities had 
a negative (β = –.31, p < .01) effect. However, 
the signifi cant effect of group composition in 
Step 1 (β = .38, p < .01) did not disappear when 
the process variables were entered in Step 2 
(β = .31, p < .01), and Sobel tests produced 
nonsignifi cant results. Thus, no evidence for full 
mediation was found. Group composition and 
negotiation processes apparently codetermine 
joint sums. 
Table 6. Regression analyses of joint sums on negotiation processes
Negotiation processes Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Overall
Integrative activities –.09 .17 .36** .18
Distributive activities .12 .07 –.35** –.07
R 2 .02 .03 .27 .04
F for R 2 0.70 0.99 10.72*** 1.05
** p < .01; ***p < .001.
Notes: Regression analyses were run separately for the overall process and for each phase. Standardized 
coeffi cients are shown.
Table 7. Hierarchical regression analyses of joint sums
Variable Step 1 Step 2
Group composition .38** .31**
Integrative activities in 
Phase 3
.34**
Distributive activities in 
Phase 3
–.31**
R 2 .15 .37
F for R 2 9.88** 10.69***
∆R2 .22
F for ∆R 2 9.62***
** p < .01; ***p < .001.
Note: Standardized coeffi cients are shown.
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Discussion
Cross-functional teams and heterogeneous 
project groups are pervasive, both inside and 
between organizations. When the members 
of such groups negotiate decisions, they are 
often aware of whether their teammates have 
individualistic or cooperative orientations. 
We have contributed to the negotiation literature 
by conducting the fi rst experiment that examines 
how the mixture of motivational orientations 
in a group affects negotiation processes and 
outcomes when members are aware of each 
other’s orientations. We found that groups con-
taining only cooperative members were more 
satisfi ed with their negotiations than were groups 
with other compositions. In contrast, we found 
that groups containing only individualistic 
members achieved higher joint sums than did 
groups with other motivational compositions. 
Finally, individualistic groups changed from 
being primarily distributive in the beginning 
to primarily integrative toward the end of their 
negotiations. 
Implications
The fact that cooperative groups achieved low 
joint sums, but were highly satisfi ed with their 
negotiations, may seem strange at fi rst blush. 
After all, members of these groups were motiv-
ated to maximize their group outcomes and knew 
that they shared this goal with one another. As 
a result, they might be expected to establish a 
trusting environment, quickly and accurately 
exchange information, and reach optimal 
agreements with relative ease. However, this is 
not what happened. Instead, cooperative groups 
seemed to engage in satisfi cing—choosing the 
fi rst acceptable agreement rather than looking 
for optimal agreements. The process analyses 
indicate that cooperative groups never became 
very integrative or very distributive. They may have 
lacked the energy needed to develop integrative 
agreements. Further research is needed to learn 
more about what goes on in cooperative groups, 
especially because our experiment failed to fi nd 
a mediating effect of the negotiation process. 
Perhaps members of cooperative groups in our 
experiment yielded uncritically because they 
knew that everyone was cooperatively oriented. 
Another explanation may be derived from the 
motivated information processing perspec-
tive (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; De Dreu, Koole, 
& Steinel, 2000). According to that perspective, 
joint outcomes in cooperative groups decrease 
when members have low rather than high epi-
stemic motivation—when they have a low desire 
to develop and hold accurate and well-informed 
conclusions about the world. Being informed 
about the motivational orientations of one’s 
opponents may lower epistemic motivation, 
because the desire to search for information 
about others is reduced. Future research might 
more closely examine the relationships among 
information about opponents, epistemic motiv-
ation, and resistance to yielding.
Individualistic groups achieved very high joint 
sums, but were not very satisfi ed with their nego-
tiations. They also displayed an escalation of 
integrative behavior, and a de-escalation of 
distributive behavior, toward the end of those 
negotiations. This pattern is consistent with 
the idea that members of individualistic groups 
develop an enlightened self-interest: they initially 
exhibit distributive behavior, establishing fi rm 
positions and strong intentions. This is followed 
by a stage in which they still argue and hold onto 
their positions, but also share information and try 
to package issues. In the fi nal stage, distributive 
activities drop dramatically and integrative 
activities begin to dominate. This pattern may 
be explained by the ‘Perceived Feasibility Per-
spective’ that extends Dual Concern Theory. 
This perspective predicts that contentious 
(distributive) behavior is an individualist’s pre-
ferred strategy, ‘. . . but problem solving is a close 
second if the contentious approach appears 
infeasible or costly. Indeed, problem solving 
often seems the most viable way of pursuing 
one’s own interests’ (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986, p. 35). 
We believe that knowing other group members 
share one’s own individualistic orientation makes 
pressure tactics seem less effective, but further 
research is required to determine more closely 
what kind of processes lead individualistic groups 
to become more integrative. One explanation 
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might be that individualistic groups more often 
reach temporary impasses (Harinck & De Dreu, 
2004). Future studies could also examine how 
individualistic groups can enhance subjective 
outcomes (such as satisfaction), so that they 
better match the other good outcomes that 
these groups achieve. 
Finally, the mixed orientation groups did not 
achieve high joint sums, nor were they very satis-
fi ed with their negotiations. These groups seemed 
unable to develop integrative processes. Instead, 
their distributive processes grew stronger, leading 
to poor outcomes. These fi ndings are consistent 
with Weingart et al. (2002), who found that mixed 
groups were more distributive than cooperative 
groups. Mixed groups may simply have problems 
fi nding a direction in which to go. Cooperators 
initially try to increase integrative activities in the 
group, while individualists constantly demand 
concessions, knowing that their opponents are 
cooperators and therefore likely to concede. 
Our findings underscore the importance 
of understanding individualistic orientations 
and how groups with varying numbers of indi-
vidualists behave and settle their conflicts. 
Individualists may be more context-sensitive 
than others. For example, cooperative groups 
achieve relatively good outcomes whether they 
consider issues simultaneously or sequentially, 
but individualistic groups do best when they 
negotiate issues simultaneously, rather than 
sequentially (Weingart et al., 1993). And cooper-
ative groups negotiate well whether the structure 
of their task is symmetrical or asymmetrical, 
but individualistic groups do well only when 
their task structure is symmetrical (Beersma & 
De Dreu, 2002). Other situational factors, 
such as time pressure (Carnevale & Lawler, 
1986) and visual access (Lewis & Fry, 1977), 
also infl uence joint outcomes in individualistic 
dyads, but not in cooperative dyads. All of this 
suggests that cooperators are relatively context-
insensitive and behave similarly across a range 
of situations. In contrast, individualists adapt 
to situations, including their opponents’ motiv-
ational orientations, more readily. This makes 
individualists more unpredictable, but does not 
necessarily make them worse negotiators. In fact, 
it was the individualistic groups in our experiment 
that negotiated the highest joint sums. 
Finally, our fi ndings also have some potential 
practical implications. When joint sums are 
important, negotiating groups should be com-
posed of individualistic members who know 
each other’s orientations. This implies that 
managers designing negotiation situations should 
encourage everyone to have individualistic 
orientations and make sure that these orientations 
are known. For example, managers would give 
instructions that are individualistic (as in our 
research) or use incentives that create indi-
vidualistic orientations (e.g. individual-based 
rewards). And these instructions or incentives 
should be communicated to all participants. 
Although it may seem absurd to create indi-
vidualistic conditions in order to enhance joint 
outcomes, it is important to remember that the 
main objective is to keep the parties from making 
inferior compromises. Individualistic orientations 
may stimulate group members to participate in 
an energetic search for integrative agreements. 
We thus advise managers to encourage ‘energetic 
cooperation’—combining the energy stemming 
from individualistic orientations with the 
cooperative behavior stemming from recognition 
of how individual goals are best accomplished. 
Negotiators should back up individualistic 
motives with an understanding of the need for 
cooperation, or back up cooperative motives 
with an understanding of the need for energy. 
It is important to remember, however, that mem-
bers of individualistic (and mixed) groups in 
our research were more dissatisfi ed with their 
negotiations than were members of cooper-
ative groups. Because subjective outcomes such 
as satisfaction may affect later meetings of an 
ongoing group, stimulating members to be 
cooperatively oriented may be as important as 
stimulating them to be individualistic. Managers 
will have to decide which outcomes matter most, 
and design negotiation situations (if possible) 
accordingly.
Limitations and future research
Our research could be improved in at least three 
general ways. First, there is a need to examine 
pe
er
-0
05
71
69
3,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 1
 M
ar
 2
01
1
383
Schei et al. negotiating groups
the actual negotiation process more thoroughly. 
We used a post-negotiation questionnaire on 
which group members discussed process ques-
tions before they gave individual responses. One 
strength of this procedure is that it probably 
improves the quality of participants’ refl ections 
on the questions. Another strength is that we 
were able to examine the negotiation process 
in several phases, which led to the discovery 
that negotiation behavior changed signifi cantly 
over time. Still, the question of why groups 
changed their behavior during their nego-
tiations remains an issue for future research. 
For example, although the steady increase 
in integrative activities in the individualistic 
groups is consistent with enlightened self-
interest, the lack of mediating effects makes 
further research necessary to support this sup-
position. This should be coupled with a more 
rigorous process analysis. Also, we relied on 
retrospective memories of group members. Past 
research has shown that retrospective memories 
can indeed yield accurate information about 
past events during negotiations (Beersma & 
De Dreu, 2002; De Dreu, Evers, Beersma, 
Kluwer, & Nauta, 2001). But, memories can 
also be inaccurate at times. In future research, 
the actual behavior of negotiating groups could 
be recorded or observed directly. This would 
make it possible to examine our suggestions that 
cooperative groups are satisfi cing rather than 
optimizing, and that they have lower resistance 
to yielding than do groups with individualistic 
members. One could, for instance, examine time 
spent negotiating and the number of proposals 
put forward. Furthermore, the argument that 
temporary impasses help individualistic groups to 
achieve high joint sums could also be tested. 
Second, our research examined the effects 
of motivational orientations when group mem-
bers are aware of one another’s orientations—
a likely situation inside organizations and 
between organizations that negotiate frequently 
with each other. We did not, however, test the 
direct effect of having versus not having such 
information. It is worth noting in this regard 
that the negotiation task we used is identical 
to the task used by Schei and Rognes (2005). 
They examined the effects of motivational 
orientations when group members had no infor-
mation about one another, but didn’t fi nd any 
differences in joint outcomes among groups 
with different compositions. Comparing the 
outcome scores for groups in their research 
with the relevant scores for our groups shows 
that their scores are similar to the scores of our 
cooperative and mixed groups. The composition 
that outperforms all others in both their work 
and ours is thus individualistic groups whose 
members are informed. It would be interesting 
to see if research designed to test the effects of 
information more directly could confi rm the 
superiority of such groups. An extension of this 
research could be to include manipulations of 
group size and the awareness of motivational 
orientations in a single project. 
Finally, we cannot rule out the possibility that 
some participants in our research changed 
their motivational orientation during the nego-
tiations. However, this seems unlikely for two 
reasons. First, motivational orientations are 
different from, and more stable than, behavior 
(cf. Rhoades & Carnevale, 1999). Although 
negotiators are expected to vary in how they 
behave to fulfi ll their goals, the goals themselves 
are likely to be fi rm. This is why we believe that 
members of individualistic groups became more 
integrative throughout the negotiation—they 
kept their individual goals, but changed their 
behavior from distributive to integrative when 
the latter behavior seemed to be the best way to 
accomplish those goals. Second, on our mani-
pulation check measure, participants described 
their goals during the negotiation, but after it 
occurred. If the participants did not adopt the 
goals they were given, or changed their goals 
during the negotiation, then that would have 
been apparent in the manipulation check, yet 
there was no evidence of either problem. 
In conclusion, the results of our research 
convey a paradox: cooperative groups are less 
likely to achieve integrative solutions than are 
groups whose members care only for their 
own outcomes. The irony is that having a goal of 
reaching a good solution was, in fact, harmful to 
the achievement of that goal. Groups negotiated 
the best solutions when their members had 
individualistic goals. Thus, Adam Smith’s 
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‘invisible hand’—the metaphor explaining 
why individuals pursuing their own good can 
also promote the good of the community—has 
appeared in yet another arena. The common 
understanding of individualistic orientations 
as essentially detrimental to negotiations must 
therefore be reconsidered. 
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